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Introduction
President Barack Obama’s State of the Union address has been described
both as “full of sound and fury” and as “signifying nothing.” The crucial
passage declared:
With all due deference to separation of powers, last week the Supreme
Court reversed a century of law that I believe will open the floodgates
for special interests—including foreign corporations—to spend
without limit in our elections. . . . I don’t think American elections
should be bankrolled by America’s most powerful interests, or worse,
by foreign entities. . . . They should be decided by the American people.
And I’d urge Democrats and Republicans to pass a bill that helps to
correct some of these problems.1
Critics have lambasted the President for insulting the Justices who were
present for his address. Chief Justice John Roberts declared that President
Obama’s comments were “very troubling,” and that his State of the Union
“degenerated into a political pep rally.”2 Professor Randy Barnett asked: “In the
history of the State of the Union has any President ever called out the Supreme
Court by name, and egged on the Congress to jeer a Supreme Court decision,
while the Justices were seated politely before him surrounded by hundreds [of]
Congressmen?”3 Others have indicated that the President’s rhetoric was
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1.

President Barack H. Obama, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on
the State of the Union (Jan. 27, 2010).

2.

Alabama: Justice Criticizes Scene at State of Union, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 2010, at
A16.

3.

Randy Barnett, State of the Union: How Did He Do?, Politico, Jan. 27, 2010,
http://www.politico.com/arena/perm/Randy_Barnett_79413362-DD20-46A2A092-D0579CC7D13F.html.
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moderate and a normal reaction to judicial rulings the chief executive thought
were wrong. Jack Balkin observed that Franklin Roosevelt skewered the
Supreme Court during the New Deal far more aggressively than the present
chief executive.4 Linda Greenhouse observed: “The president’s tone was mild
compared to the animation in some other parts of the speech.”5
Commentators might better appreciate the recent constitutional winter
(“of our discontent”?) by remembering that Macbeth speaks of the “poor
player” who “struts and frets his hour upon the stage” immediately before his
famous observation that life is “a tale [t]old by an idiot.”6 Presidents only have a
brief time to remake politics in their image. Time is short both because
constitutional rules limit the chief executive to a maximum of two four-year
terms and because, in American politics, the political window for substantial
progressive reform tends to close quickly.7 In his first year of office, President
Obama attempted to achieve his goals by rallying a bipartisan consensus in
favor of health care and other measures. That effort failed. The State of the
Union may have inaugurated a new phase in the Obama presidency. In this
phase, President Obama begins the slow process of reconstructing national
politics in ways that permit his policy coalition to achieve policy goals more
effectively.
Whether Obama’s rhetoric “signifies nothing” or “struts upon the stage”
depends on whether the president was engaged in symbolic politics or
demonstrated a new willingness to play “constitutional hardball” with
Republicans. Mark Tushnet defines that practice as:
[P]olitical claims and practices—legislative and executive initiatives—
that are without much question within the bounds of existing
constitutional doctrine and practice but that are nonetheless in some
tension with existing pre-constitutional understandings. It is hardball
because its practitioners see themselves as playing for keeps in a special
kind of way; they believe the stakes of the political controversy their
4.

Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/01/badmr-obama-was-very-very-mean-to-poor.html (Jan. 28, 2010, 11:37 EST).

5.

Posting
of
Linda
Greenhouse
to
Opinionator,
http://
opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/justice-alitos-reaction/?ref=opinion
(Jan. 27, 2010, 23:18 EST).

6.

William Shakespeare, Macbeth 133 (James M. Garnett ed., Benj. H. Sanborn &
Co. 1922) (1897). Some comments also would insist that any speech by President
Obama is “a tale told by an idiot.” See Posting of Paul Rosenberg to Open Left, It’s
Official: Obama Is an Idiot, http://openleft.com/diary/17112/its-official-obama-isan-idiot (Jan. 25, 2010, 22:30 EST); Obama Is an Idiot T-Shirts, Shirts and Custom
Obama Is an Idiot Clothing, http://www.zazzle.com/obama+is+an+idiot+tshirts
(last visited June 22, 2010).

7.

See Philip A. Klinkner & Rogers M. Smith, The Unsteady March: The Rise
and Decline of Racial Equality in America 5 (1999) (noting that the periods
in which Americans progress toward racial equality are far shorter than periods of
racial stagnation).
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actions provoke are quite high, and that their defeat and their
opponents’ victory would be a serious, perhaps permanent setback to
the political positions they hold.8
Part I of this Essay makes the case for symbolic politics. Presidents often
have political reasons for subjecting courts to mere words. Barack Obama is no
different. Part II makes the case for constitutional hardball. It was presaged by
mere words against the Republican-dominated federal judiciary but was
manifested more seriously in the President’s subsequent willingness to
circumvent the various veto points, most notably the filibuster, in the national
legislative process that had previous enabled Republicans to prevent the passage
of health care reform. The majority Democratic Party, as Obama’s State of the
Union may have declared in retrospect, no longer will permit the minority
Republican Party to rely on preexisting political procedures to prevent or stall
progressive legislation. Both Parts attempt to make their different cases as
strongly as possible. Whether the 2010 State of the Union Address was positiontaking or constitutional hardball, however, is for the future to tell.
I.

“Signifying Nothing”: Obama as Position-Taker

Presidential criticism of Supreme Court decisions and Supreme Court
Justices is as American as baseball and apple pie. Martin Van Buren issued the
first criticism of a judicial decision in an annual message to Congress when he
complained about the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kendall v. United States ex rel.
Stokes9 that federal justices could issue a writ of mandamus to a Cabinet
official.10 Theodore Roosevelt claimed he could have “carve[d] out of a banana
a Judge with more backbone”11 after Oliver Wendell Holmes rejected the
Administration’s understanding of antitrust law in Northern Securities Co. v.
United States.12 Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon regularly groused in
public about liberal Supreme Court Justices and decisions.13
Both Barack Obama and John McCain demonstrated on the campaign trial
that they were prepared to continue this presidential tradition of judicial
criticism. Both candidates condemned the judicial ruling in Kennedy v.
8.

Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 523, 523 (2004)
(footnotes omitted).

9.

37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).

10.

President Martin Van Buren, Second Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1838).

11.

Henry J. Abraham, Justices, Presidents, and Senators: A History of U.S.
Supreme Court Appointments from Washington to Bush II 55 (5th ed.
2008).

12.

193 U.S. 197 (1904).

13.

See Abraham, supra note 11, at 235-36; Stephen J. Wermeil, The Nomination of
Justice Brennan: Eisenhower’s Mistake? A Look at the Historical Record, 11 Const.
Comment. 515, 536 (1995).
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Louisiana14 that child rapists could not be executed.15 Obama “strongly
disagree[d]” with the Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart16 to
sustain a federal law banning partial birth abortions.17 McCain routinely
condemned Roe v. Wade18 and other instances of liberal judicial activism.19
Most Presidents and presidential candidates who criticize the Supreme
Court simply attempt to make more favorable judicial appointments. Van
Buren’s election marked the end of Jacksonian attacks on the federal judiciary.20
Theodore Roosevelt proposed curbing judicial power when he ran as a
Progressive in 1912.21 While President from 1901 to 1909, he sought only to place
more progressive Justices on the federal bench.22 The Eisenhower
Administration steadfastly refused to support efforts to curb judicial power.23
The Detainee Treatment Act of 200524 aside, there was no bite whenever Bush II
Administration officials barked at the federal judiciary.
Presidents and candidates for the presidency have the same reason as other
politicians for criticizing federal courts. Product differentiation is important.
Given the visibility of the presidential office, Presidents may have good reason
to remind the public that they do not agree with what the Supreme Court is
doing. By criticizing Justice Holmes, Theodore Roosevelt was communicating
to opinion leaders and the general public that he favored a more aggressive
antitrust policy than the judicial majority. Judicial criticism is an easy way to
score political points. As Stephen Engel has noted, most attacks on courts are
aimed at a politician’s political base and are not serious efforts to alter the
balance of institutional power.25 Political scientists describe such rhetoric as
14.

128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).

15.

McCain, Obama Disagree with Child Rape Ruling, MSNBC, June 26, 2008,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25379987/.

16.

550 U.S. 124 (2007).

17.

Robin Toner, Court Ruling Catapults Abortion Back into ‘08 Race, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 19, 2007, at A23.

18.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

19.

See Toner, supra note 17.

20.

Mark A. Graber, James Buchanan as Savior? Judicial Power, Political
Fragmentation, and the Failed 1831 Repeal of Section 25, 88 Or. L. Rev. 95, 142-43
(2009).

21.

William G. Ross, A Muted Fury: Populists, Progressives, and Labor
Unions Confront the Courts, 1890-1937, at 134-36 (1994).

22.

See id. at 87-88.

23.

See Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Warren Court and American Politics 88-90, 113
(2000).

24.

Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739.

25.

See Stephen M. Engel, ‘A Mere Party Machine’? Judicial Authority, Party
Development, and the Changing Politics of Attacking the Courts 55-57 (May
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“position taking.” David Mayhew, the scholar who coined this phrase observes:
“The electoral requirement is not that [a governing official] make pleasing
things happen but that he make pleasing judgmental statements.”26 Another
term of art is “cheap talk,” the “communication of messages that are costless to
produce, do not involve binding promises, and cannot be verified by the
receiver.”27
Presidential court-bashing tends to be position-taking or cheap talk for two
related reasons. First, changing the course of judicial decisions is quite difficult.
The Constitution of the United States created a government that permits strong
minorities to exercise a practical veto on any policy that promises substantial
change. Inevitably throughout American history, the Court has been saved by
those veto points. National Republicans and Northern Democrats in Congress
during the early 1830s successfully blocked Southern Jacksonian efforts to strip
federal jurisdiction.28 Southern Democrats, fearful of a more racially liberal
Court, thwarted the Court-blocking plan.29 Moreover, as numerous political
scientists have noted, most Presidents have little reason to object to the Court.30
More often than not, most of the Justices on the Supreme Court are appointed
by either the sitting President or a President allied with the sitting President.
Robert Dahl pointed out in a seminal article that “it would appear, on political
grounds, somewhat unrealistic to suppose that a Court whose members are
recruited in the fashion of Supreme Court justices would long hold to norms of
Right or Justice substantially at odds with the rest of the political elite.”31 The
judicial majority during the Van Buren presidency was appointed by Van Buren
or Andrew Jackson. The second President Bush inherited a judicial majority
appointed by Ronald Reagan and his father. No doubt such a tribunal
occasionally makes a decision the President does not like. The same likely is true
of the Secretary of State or the presidential press secretary. The important point
is that most Presidents most of the time prefer a Supreme Court with which
they occasionally disagree to some alternative institutional division of
constitutional authority. The Court, as Martin Shapiro and Gordon Silverstein
suggest, is a bit like a certain kind of “junkyard dog.” People who buy the
2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with the Yale Law
& Policy Review).
26.

David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection 62 (2d ed. 2004).

27.

Daniel F. Spulber, The Map of Commerce: Internet Search, Competition, and the
Circular Flow of Information, 5 J. Competition L. & Econ. 633, 656 (2009).

28.

See Graber, supra note 20, at 130.

29.

See Kevin J. McMahon, Reconsidering Roosevelt on Race: How the
Presidency Paved the Road to Brown 61-96 (2004).

30.

See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial
Supremacy: The Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional
Leadership in U.S. History (2007).

31.

Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. Pub. L. 279, 291 (1957).
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animal do so because they believe the benefits of canine protection outweigh
the occasional moment when the dog bites the wrong person.32
Much evidence suggests that President Obama was engaged in little more
than position-taking or cheap talk when he criticized judicial decisions while on
the campaign trail and during the State of the Union address. Although he
called on Congress to consider a new campaign finance law, the Obama
Administration has not made campaign finance a priority. Health care, jobs,
and Afghanistan are the present Administration’s priorities. Linda Greenhouse
observed: “The president offered no specifics and did not endorse any of
them”33 when calling on Congress to regulate campaign finance. The
appointment of Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who dissented in Citizens United v.
FEC,34 is the only contribution President Obama has presently made to the
cause of campaign finance reform. The President appears to be even more
toothless on Kennedy v. Louisiana. The Administration has done nothing to
remove constitutional restrictions on executing child rapists. Although no hard
evidence exists, the persons President Obama is appointing to the federal
judiciary seem to be moderate liberals more likely to increase rather than
remove constitutional barriers to executions. The message being
communicated, it appears, is merely that the President of the United States does
not like child rapists.
No good reason exists for thinking that President Obama would be able to
issue a broad challenge to judicial power in the near future or that he would
want to issue such a challenge. As the failed nomination of Dawn Johnson35
indicates, powerful minorities still exercise powerful vetoes in the American
constitutional system. Any attack on the federal judiciary likely would unite all
Republicans and conservative Democrats against the Administration. The result
would be almost certain failure. If Roosevelt’s experience is any indication,36 a
failed attack on the Supreme Court would also be a fatal blow against other
Obama Administration policies. Moreover, President Obama presently has little
reason to act against the Supreme Court. Citizens United is the only decision
inconsistent with important progressive priorities, at least as those priorities
have been defined by the Administration.37 Given that the present Supreme

32.

Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics, & Judicialization
163-64 (2002); Gordon Silverstein, Sequencing the DNA of Comparative
Constitutionalism: A Thought Experiment, 65 Md. L. Rev. 49, 50 (2006).

33.

Greenhouse, supra note 5.

34.

130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).

35.

Charlie Savage, Long After Nomination, an Obama Choice Withdraws, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 10, 2010, at A16.

36.

David Adamany, Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court, 1973
Wis. L. Rev. 790, 839-41, 844-45.

37.

Most progressives have condemned such judicial decisions as Heller v. District of
Columbia, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). The Obama Administration has not.
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Court remains committed to protecting abortion rights,38 prohibiting school
prayer,39 and providing more protection for persons suspected of crime than
most state or federal legislators,40 progressives are unlikely to fare substantially
better if constitutional authority is rerouted to elected officials.
II. “His Hour upon the Stage”: Obama and Constitutional Hardball
All presidential criticisms of Supreme Court Justices and decisions are not
created equal. Most presidential criticisms do little more than increase the
political temperature. Some presidential criticisms auger or complement
stronger attacks on the federal judiciary. Thomas Jefferson in 1801 complained
that the Federalists “have retired into the judiciary . . . . and from that battery all
the works of republicanism are to be beaten down and erased.”41 Two years
later, Jefferson and his political allies began to impeach Federalist Justices. In
1832, Andrew Jackson made clear that he would not enforce the judicial decision
in Worcester v. Georgia requiring Georgia to free two missionaries arrested in
Cherokee Territory.42 The previous year, Jacksonians in Congress proposed
legislation that would in practice strip the Justices of the power to declare state
laws unconstitutional.43 Republicans during the late 1850s and early 1860s both
criticized and attacked judicial power. Shortly after claiming the Supreme Court
was relying on a “horse-and-buggy definition of interstate commerce,”44
Franklin Roosevelt proposed the Court-packing plan.45
Keith Whittington details how these substantial attacks on federal judicial
power are made by chief executives that political scientists classify as
“reconstructive presidents.”46 A reconstructive President is elected with a
mandate to alter fundamentally the political and constitutional vision of the
previous regime. They have an electoral warrant, Stephen Skowronek notes, to
engage “in a wholesale reconstruction of the standards of legitimate national
government.”47 Abraham Lincoln was committed to repudiating the Jacksonian

38.

See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

39.

See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).

40.

See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).

41.

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Dickinson (Dec. 19, 1801), in 10 The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 301, 302 (Albert Ellery Branch ed., 1907).

42.

Graber, supra note 20, at 127.

43.

Report upon the Judiciary, 7 Reg. Deb. app. at lxxvii (1831).

44.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Press Conference, (May 31, 1935).

45.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, (Mar. 9, 1937).

46.

Whittington, supra note 30, at 49-50.

47.

Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from
John Adams to George Bush 37 (1993).
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constitutional vision embodied in Scott v. Sandford48 and the Kansas-Nebraska
Act. Franklin Roosevelt challenged an inherited constitutional vision embodied
by the liberty of contract and dual federalism. When reconstructive presidents
attack the Court, they do so in order to implement a new constitutional vision
and not merely to please their political base. The course of judicial doctrines
must be changed, from their perspective, because the Justices are blocking the
implementation of their program, not simply because they are disappointed in a
particular ruling or two. “Because reconstructive presidencies are attempting to
restructure inherited constitutional understandings,” Whittington writes, “they
find the judiciary to be an intrinsic challenge to their authority.”49
Presidential efforts to reconstitute the Court largely fail, even when
promoted by a President with an apparent mandate to implement a new
constitutional vision. The Roosevelt Court-packing plan was the most
spectacular such failure. Democrats could not fundamentally alter judicial
power, even in 1936 after they won the largest Electoral College landslide in
history and gained unprecedented control of both houses of Congress.50
Jefferson earns the silver medal in the presidential failure competition.
Democratic Republicans from 1801 to 1804 were able to repeal a last-minute
Federalist expansion of the federal judiciary and impeach one senile lower court
Federalist judicial appointee. Nevertheless, after the failed impeachment of
Justice Chase, no serious sustained effort was made for twenty years to
challenge federal judicial authority.51 Jacksonian Court curbing efforts were
rejected by nearly a three to one margin in Congress.52 Whittington suggests
that the Reagan Administration’s effort to challenge courts was too weak as to
even qualify for the court-curbing competition.53
Lincoln and his fellow Americans launched the only successful assault on
the federal judiciary in American history. The Judiciary Act of 186254 was the
primary vehicle by which antislavery forces reconstructed judicial power.
Although presently unknown, that measure dramatically altered the course of
Supreme Court decision-making. When Lincoln took office, five of the nine
federal judicial circuits were located entirely within slave states. Moreover,
Presidents as a matter of practice appointed one Supreme Court Justice from
each circuit. The result was that the Jacksonian Supreme Court always had a

48.

60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).

49.

Whittington, supra note 30, at 52.

50.

See McMahon, supra note 29, at 61-65.

51.

See Richard E. Ellis, The Jeffersonian Crisis: Courts and Politics in the
Young Republic 104 (1971).

52.

7 Reg. Deb. 542 (1831).

53.

Whittington, supra note 30, at 274.

54.

12 Stat. 576 (1862).
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slave state majority.55 Indeed, throughout most of antebellum American history,
at least half of the Supreme Court Justices hailed from slave states. The Judiciary
Act of 1862 changed this policy. That measure reapportioned the federal
judiciary so that seven circuits existed entirely in the free states.56 A special West
Coast district was added shortly thereafter.57 The result was that by the time
Lincoln was murdered, eight of the ten federal circuits were in the free states.
Lincoln’s judicial appointees created a northern judicial majority that has
remained unbroken for the last 150 years.
Reconstructive Presidents are hardly failures, even when their direct attacks
on the courts do not succeed. The judicial appointments process frequently
obviates the need for court-curbing. Jacksonians enjoyed a judicial majority by
the end of Jackson’s second term of office. No sooner had the court-curbing
plan been defeated than a series of resignations and deaths enabled Franklin
Roosevelt to gain a liberal majority on the Supreme Court the old-fashioned
way. Moreover, as Whittington points out, presidential attacks on the Court
open only one front in an all-out battle against every vestige of the ancient
regime throughout the national government. “Conflicts with the courts,” he
details, “are only a single skirmish within the larger presidential offensive to
establish his authority to remake American politics.”58 These broader attacks
historically have been more successful than the narrow campaign against
judicial pretense. The national government does business differently after a
reconstructive presidency.
Reconstructive Presidents confront a political system containing substantial
barriers to their reforming efforts. The problem is that institutions are
structured in ways that make reform difficult, not simply that hostile partisans
control rival branches of the national government. The presidential cabinet in
the early national regime more often resembled a coalition of party chiefs than
an instrument for governance. Roosevelt inherited an executive branch that was
ill-equipped to manage the emerging administrative state. Hence, in order to
achieve their ambitions, reconstructive Presidents must not only replace rivals
with supporters, but they must also reconstruct the government so that its
institutions are capable, when functioning properly, of achieving their
cherished reforms. Skowronek notes how Presidents with ambitious agendas
must engage in “an assault on the residual institutional infrastructure of the old
order.”59 Liberals during the 1960s, for example, had to change dramatically the

55.

For a discussion of this aspect of federal judicial authority, see Justin Crowe,
Westward Expansion, Preappointment Politics, and the Making of the Southern
Slaveholding Supreme Court, 24 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 90 (2010).

56.

12 Stat. 576, 576 (1862).

57.

12 Stat. 794 (1863).

58.

Whittington, supra note 30, at 59.

59.

Skowronek, supra note 47, at 38.
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support system for litigation in order to be able to implement the liberalism of
the Warren Court.60
All reconstructive presidencies are marked by important changes in the way
governmental institutions do business. Jefferson and Jackson replaced a
constitutional order where office was to be the primary marker of political
loyalty and with a system in which governing officials were motivated more by
political party obligations.61 How members of Congress voted on the censure
and the expunging resolutions depended more on their alliances with Jackson
than on their identity as members of the national legislature.62 Reconstructive
Presidents also alter relations between Congress and the White House. Only
during the Jackson Administration did the Secretary of the Treasury clearly
become identified as an executive officer, and the veto become an instrument of
public policy.63 The Roosevelt Administration’s executive reorganization
created a modern presidency capable of managing the administrative state.64
The Lincoln Administration exercised unprecedented presidential powers.65
Upon taking office, President Obama found himself in a similar position to
most reconstructive presidents. As was the case with Roosevelt, Lincoln, and
Jefferson, President Obama was at the head of a relatively new majority party
that nominally controlled all elected branches of the national government. Only
the judiciary had a majority of hostile partisans. As was the case with Jefferson,
Jackson, Lincoln, and Roosevelt, however, President Obama confronted
institutional practices that made achieving his reform efforts difficult, if not
impossible. In the current President’s case, the major obstacle was a
combination of political fragmentation through the national legislature and the
filibuster in the Senate that made the passage of his reform agenda, perhaps any
substantial reform agenda, nearly impossible. Health care, in particular, fell
prey to these governing arrangements. Imprisoned by a political system which
required the Administration to bargain with a bewildering number of
Democrats in Congress, the legislation began to look more like a series of
distinctive party gifts for all comers than a coherent piece of policy. Worse,
rather than merely accommodate a majority of national legislators, President

60.

See Howard Gillman, Party Politics and Constitutional Change: The Political
Origins of Liberal Judicial Activism, in The Supreme Court and American
Political Development 138 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006).

61.

See Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a party System: The Rise of
Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 1780-1840, at 75 (1969).

62.

Donald B. Cole, The Presidency of Andrew Jackson 205-06, 252-53 (1993).

63.

See Leonard D. White, The Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative
History 1829-1861, at 28-38 (1954).

64.

See William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal
1932-1940, at 327-28 (1963).

65.

See Daniel Farber, Lincoln’s Constitution 118 (2003).
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Obama was forced to accommodate three-fifths of the Senate in order to avoid
what was becoming the routine use of the filibuster.
The reform ambitions of reconstructive Presidents and the frustrations of
President Obama’s first year in office suggest a broader, more interesting,
framework for his critique of the Supreme Court in the 2010 State of the Union
address. Commentators are mistaken if they see the sentence quoted on the first
page of this Essay as simply an attempt to intimidate or put pressure on the
Court. Instead, the 2010 State of the Union address inaugurated a period in
which the President more aggressively confronted the institutional barriers
against progressive reform. Rather than play by preexisting norms, he
challenged the procedural obstacles that had thwarted progressive policies
during his first year in office.
Health care is the most obvious manifestation of this new aggressive
institutional stance. During the winter of 2010, the Obama Administration and
health care supporters in Congress made clear that they would not abide by
previous rules. From the very beginning, President Obama played far more
constitutional hardball than had previously been the case. The President,
Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid
made clear that, should Democratic majorities agree on a bill, that bill would
become law. The filibuster in 2010, they determined, would not block health
care reforms. In March, President Obama called on the House of
Representatives to treat their health care bill as a reconciliation measure, a
process that would require only fifty-one Senators to support health care. He
told Congress that health care “‘deserves the same kind of up or down vote that
was cast on welfare reform . . . on the Children’s Health Insurance Program, . . .
for Cobra health coverage for the unemployed and . . . both Bush tax cuts—all
of which had to pass Congress with nothing more than a simple majority.’”66
Prominent legislators also suggested that the House of Representatives employ a
constitutionally controversial “deem and pass” procedure. That procedure
would, in effect, allow the House to vote on amendments to the Senate health
bill and also serve as the vote to approve the Senate bill. Hence, health care
would become law, even if the Senate rejected the House amendments.67 While
such a vote proved unnecessary, the very proposal indicated that legislative
majorities would no longer let inherited governmental procedures derail their
progressive agenda.
During the winter and early spring of 2010, the Obama Administration gave
two other indications of an increased willingness to engage in institutional
combat. Frustrated by the slow pace of the Senate confirmation process, the
President made a series of controversial recess appointments on March 27, 2010.
The most notable of these was a recess appointment to the National Labor

66.

Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, President Calls for Final Vote on Health Bill,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 2010, at A1.

67.

David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Democrats Consider New Maneuvers for
Health Bill, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 2010, at A18.
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Relations Board given to Craig Becker, a prominent labor lawyer vigorously
opposed by most Republicans.68 Obama’s decision to nominate Goodwin Liu to
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, his most progressive judicial
appointment to date, may also indicate that, after a dalliance with a centrist
coalition, the Administration is moving to the left.69 Such a leftward movement
will necessitate further attacks on inherited political processes. If President
Obama is to be a successful reconstructive President, the health care bill, the
recess appointments, and the Liu nomination will only be the beginning of the
full-scale challenge to the numerous veto points that presently make passing
and implementing a progressive agenda nearly impossible.
Conclusion
Whether the State of the Union address and the recent politics of health
care are the first of the skirmishes in this political reconstruction is impossible
to determine at present. Even in the online edition of a law review, one should
avoid making significant inferences on very few data points. President Obama
in both his State of the Union address and subsequent actions has behaved
differently than during in his first year in office. Still, to paraphrase Justice
Scalia, we should be careful not to “mistake” “a fit of spite” for “a
Kulturkampf.”70 Whether Americans this year witnessed a new pattern of
presidential behavior or merely a desperate effort to pass a bill remains to be
seen. Much will depend on how health care is received and on the election of
2010. Indeed, we will not know for a good many years whether we are living in
the equivalent of 1932-1936, watching the beginnings of a new constitutional
order, or 1838-1841, merely observing the historical equivalent of the Whig
hiccup during a period of Jacksonian dominance.
The meaning of Obama’s mild rebuke of the Supreme Court also cannot be
presently determined. No one can predict the judicial response to more
aggressive Obama Administration efforts to reconstruct American politics.
Moreover, a reconstructive Obama presidency bent on challenging judicial
pretense will have to overcome what Stephen Skowronek refers to as the
“[w]aning of [p]olitical [t]ime.”71 As governing institutions become increasingly
independent and impervious to change, reconstructive Presidents have more
difficulty achieving their goals. Skowronek observes “a pattern of greater
institutional resilience in the face of . . . presidents’ order-shattering authority,
of an ever thicker government that can parry and deflect more of their

68.

See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Bypasses Senates Process, Filling 15 Posts, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 28, 2010, at A1.

69.

See Charlie Savage, Appeals Court Nominee Ignites a Partisan Battle, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 13, 2010, at A15.

70.

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

71.

Skowronek, supra note 47, at 407.

24

Essay - Mark Graber - 11 - Final - 2010.06.29

6/29/2010 2:52:04 PM

A TALE TOLD BY A PRESIDENT

repudiative thrust.”72 The disappearance of the short-term Justice is a
particularly recent phenomenon that complicates presidential efforts to rebuild
the federal judiciary in their image. Justin Crowe and Christopher Karpowitz
note that before the Great Society, many Justices served only a short period of
time. The last short-termer was Arthur Goldberg, who left the Court in 1968.
“[T]he modern Court is different not because the justices are setting new
records in longevity,” they claim, “but because it does not include any shorttermers like Benjamin Curtis or Sherman Minton, the kinds of justices whose
relatively brief service has long been a staple on the Court.”73 The extinction of
the short-term Justices complicates the normal processes by which
reconstructive Presidents remake the federal judiciary. If the five conservatives
on the present Court live and do not retire until they are as old as Justice John
Paul Stevens was when he stepped down, Democrats will have to win the next
four presidential elections in order to fashion a judicial majority. This
possibility may make future constitutional politics quite interesting should the
conservatives on the Supreme Court challenge a newly emboldened Obama
Administration on health care and other executive priorities.

72.

Id. at 413.

73.

Justin Crowe & Christopher F. Karpowitz, Where Have You Gone, Sherman
Minton? The Decline of the Short-Term Supreme Court Justice, 5 Persp. on Pol.
425, 426 (2007).
25

